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Abstract 
This paper summarizes two main findings in the Post-Keynesian literature regarding the linkages 
between financialization, income distribution, accumulation and productivity. Firstly, at the core of 
secular stagnation lies the missing link between profits and investment. Secondly, rising inequality 
and financialization have been the main reasons for this missing link and hence the major brakes 
against capital accumulation and growth.  The paper concludes with alternative progressive policies 
based on a coordinated policy mix of equality-led development and public investment. 
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1. Introduction 
The world is likely to be entering the third phase of the Great Recession, with a risk of a further 
decline of already-low growth to near stagnation, particularly if global demand decreases further as 
prospects weaken for emerging economies.  In the first two phases, the crisis spread from the US to the 
Eurozone, and capital flew to emerging economies fuelled by cheap central bank lending in the core. 
At this third new phase, this emerging market bubble is about to burst. The emerging economies have 
been the locomotive of growth in the global economy in the aftermath of the Great Recession; and now 
we are facing the fact that China and other emerging economies cannot anymore be the driver of 
growth in the G7. The advanced economies in the meantime have done very little to change the 
fundamentals of their flawed economic growth model, which were the root causes of the Great 
Recession.  
Building on the Post-Keynesian literature, this paper argues that at the root of this new normal 
of slow and volatile growth rates in the world economy, dubbed as secular stagnation, lies the vicious 
circle of rising inequality, financialization, chronically low demand, slower accumulation and 
productivity increases, and low growth and fewer or bad quality jobs. 
The next section presents the linkages between financialization, income distribution, 
accumulation and productivity. Section three presents alternative progressive policies based on a 
coordinated policy mix of equality-led development and public investment. The final section 
concludes. 
2. Financialization, distribution, accumulation, and productivity 
The slowdown in growth rates along with higher volatility is not a new phenomenon; this is a 
trend observed in all the advanced capitalist countries as well as some emerging economies in Latin 
America or for instance Turkey since the rise of neoliberalism (Onaran and Galanis, 2014).  At the 
core of this development lies the missing link between profits and investment. Rising inequality and 
financialization have been the main reasons behind this missing link and hence the major brakes on 
capital accumulation and growth.    
Epstein (2005:1) defines financialization as the "increasing importance of financial markets, 
financial motives, and financial institutions, and financial elites in the operation of the economy and its 
governing institutions, both at the national and international level". There is evidence of negative 
impacts of expanding financial sector on income distribution and demand (Stockhammer, 2016; 
Onaran et al., 2011; Hein, 2013), and in particular on investment (Stockhammer, 2004, 2006; Hein and 
van Treeck 2008; van Treeck 2008; Orhagnazi, 2008; Dallery, 2009; Cordonnier and Van de Velde, 
2015).    
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Despite increasing profits, private investment remained weak in the advanced economies as 
firms directed their profits to financial speculation (Tori and Onaran, 2015, 2016; Orhangazi 2008; 
Stockhammer 2006; van Treeck 2008). According to research on the investment behaviour of non-
financial corporations in the US, the UK, and EU15, not only high dividend payments but also 
increasing financial revenues of firms due to their surging financial activities crowd out private 
investment in physical machinery and equipment (Tori and Onaran, 2015, 2016; Orhangazi 2008). 
Perversely, financial activities do not provide more funds for productive activity in the case of large 
companies.1 Rotta (2015) defines a broader category of unproductive accumulation from a Marxist 
perspective, including not only finance but also activities based on knowledge rents, and finds that 
unproductive accumulation has occurred systematically at a faster pace than productive accumulation 
in the US in the post-war period, and productive and unproductive forms of accumulation do not share 
a common trend or a stable long-run equilibrium relationship.   
Financialization and its effect on corporate strategies have had also detrimental effects on the 
bargaining power of labour (Stockhammer, 2016; Hein and van Treeck, 2008; Hein and Mundt, 2012). 
On the one hand the orientation towards shareholder value increased the dominance of shareholders’ 
demands over workers’ demands. On the other hand, increased domestic and global financial 
investment opportunities increased the fall-back options of non-financial firms both in terms of 
geographic location as well as financial assets, putting pressure on domestic and irreversible real 
investment in physical machinery and capital.  
Financialization and increased fall back options of capital, in particular with respect to tax 
competition between different jurisdictions, has also had effects on the composition of public spending 
and taxation (Onaran and Boesch, 2014), which in turn has contributed to the decline in the bargaining 
power of labour.   
These developments state went along with further institutional and structural changes that led 
to a significant fall in trade union density and collective bargaining coverage (Onaran et al., 2015). As 
a result, in the last three and a half decades, inequality has increased substantially and the share of 
national income that goes to wages has fallen dramatically across the world (Onaran and Galanis, 
2014; Stockhammer, 2016).   
Figures 1a and 1b show the developments in the share of wages in national income (labour 
compensation, adjusted for the labour income of the self employed, as a ratio to GDP at factor cost) 
along with the rate of growth of GDP in the US and the 15 Western European Member States of the 
EU (EU15). The share of wages in the US GDP fell from 68.1% in 1974 to 63.0% in 2007, just before 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The results are more nuanced in the case of small enterprises who are facing more substantial credit constraints and 
thereby rely on internal funds (Tori and Onaran, 2015, 2016; Orhangazi 2008). 
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the Great Recession. During the Great Recession and in its aftermath, the wage share continued to 
decline by another 2.8%-points during 2009-2013, after which it stabilized. During normal recessions, 
the wage share in the advanced capitalist countries is counter-cyclical, as productivity (output per 
employee) falls but real wages do not fall or at least not proportionately. The Great Recession has 
defied this general trend with the wage share continuing to fall during the recession as well as during 
the recovery. At the same time the growth rate has been significantly lower and more volatile, with an 
average annual growth of 2.8% in the US during 1975-2015, compared with 4.0% annual growth 
during 1961-1974. In Europe (the EU15), the share of wages declined from 72.8% in 1975 in their 
peak to 62.6% in 2007. While in the early years of the recession, the wage share in the EU15 increased 
slightly, there was a 1%-point fall during 2009-2011, since when the wage share has been stagnant.  
Growth performance of the EU15 has been similarly disappointing along with the secular fall in the 
wage share: average annual growth has fallen from 4.7% during 1961-1974 to 1.9% during 1960-1974. 
Figure 1 
Wage stagnation has fuelled increasing profits as a share of GDP, but this has led to bleak 
prospects in terms of demand. While this is puzzle from a neoclassical point of view, it is not 
unexpected for Post-Keynesian/Kaleckian economics, which highlight the dual role of wages as both a 
cost item and source of demand. Econometric findings in the Post-Kaleckian research tradition shows 
that a lower share of wages in national income leads to a lower GDP in most large countries (Onaran 
and Galanis, 2014; Onaran and Obst, 2015; Hein and Vogel, 2008; Naastepad and Storm, 2006/7; 
Stockhammer and Onaran, 2004). The negative impact is amplified when wage stagnation policies are 
imposed in an integrated region such as the EU via the European Commission policies (EC, 2006; 
2013) or globally in the context of a global race to the bottom in labour share (Onaran and Galanis, 
2014; Onaran and Obst, 2015; Stockhammer et al 2009).  
Hence the demand regime is, as it is termed, “wage-led” in the majority of the large countries 
and in large economic regions such as the EU or globally. On the one hand, a pro-capital redistribution 
of income leads to lower domestic consumption demand. On the other hand, but the stimulus to private 
investment due to higher profits remain weak, if any at all, and at the same time private investment 
responds strongly to the fall in demand. Onaran and Obst (2015) show that despite increasing profit 
share in GDP, private investment decreased in the majority of the EU15 countries due to the 
substantially negative impact of the simultaneous fall in the wage share on demand across the EU15. 
Firms’ directing their profits to financial speculation in the absence of a healthy growth in demand is a 
result of this process as much as it contributes to the lack of demand. The much celebrated impact of 
wage stagnation on external demand, i.e. higher net exports, is rather weak in the case of large, 
relatively closed economies, and the impact is diminished substantially when all countries implement 
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the same international competiveness policies based on labour market flexibility and cuts to labour 
costs (Onaran and Galanis, 2014; Onaran and Obst, 2015). This leaves countries with the net negative 
impact of rising inequality on domestic demand, i.e. the sum of the effects on domestic consumption 
and private investment. Moreover, some small countries, which have profit-led demand regimes, i.e. 
countries, which grow faster along with an increasing profit share (a falling wage share) if they are the 
only country experiencing this shift in income distribution, also start experiencing lower demand and 
growth, when their trade partners also implement similar wage moderation policies. Austria and 
Ireland in the EU15 and Canada, Mexico, and Argentinain the world are such examples (see Onaran 
and Obst, 2015 for EU15; Onaran and Galanis, 2014 for G20).   
In other words there is a fallacy of composition both at the national level between the rational 
of the firm vs. the aggregate economy, and at the global level between the national rational of a small 
economy vs. the global economy. Although a high share of export openness increases the importance 
of international markets and the likelihood of a small economy being profit-led in isolation, increased 
contagion of similar wage moderation policies in the age of globalization, decreases the impact of such 
policies on the competitiveness of each country, and make them individually and collectively more 
likely to be wage-led.  
The finding that inequality deters growth is no longer confined to heterodox research; there is 
an increasing number of research being produced at the IMF and the OECD (e.g. Berg et al., 2012; 
Foerster and Cingano 2014), which justify the negative effects mostly by supply side factors such as 
barriers to human capital accumulation. Unfortunately, the demand side effects of inequality are still 
neglected in these mainstream analyses. The main source of inspiration in this research is the new 
institutionalist political economy with its neoclassical origins, which highlights higher political 
instability and uncertainty  (Alesina and Perotti, 1996); increased risk of popular support for 
redistribution and higher capital taxes with negative consequences for investment (Alesina and Rodrik, 
1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994);  and the negative effects of credit market imperfections on human 
capital accumulation (Galor and Zeira, 1993). Most recently, a study by the IMF (Decressin et al., 
2015) has also analysed the impact of a simultaneous decline in wages in all the Eurozone countries, 
and finds a negative effect on the GDP of the Eurozone as a whole; thus confirming one of the core 
results in the Post-Kaleckian literature (Onaran and Obst, 2015): A simultaneous decline in the wage 
share in all EU15 countries eliminates the positive competitiveness effects on net exports, and leads to 
overall negative impact on growth. 
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, the lack of a full recovery in wage income continues to 
be a drag on household confidence and demand, which in turn discourages business investment in the 
absence of a healthy growth in domestic demand. In the past, countries such as the US the UK, Spain 
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and Ireland, or emerging economies such as Turkey and South Africa relied on household debt to 
maintain consumption levels in the absence of a healthy growth in their wages and salaries. The mirror 
image of this debt-driven growth model was the export-led growth model of Germany Austria, and 
Japan  or China in the periphery, where countries tried to export their way out of the problem of 
deficiency of domestic demand faced with a declining wage share.  After the crisis, recovery in many 
countries with the debt-driven model, such as the UK is still based on the same shaky grounds as it is 
driven by a massive increase in private household debt and will remain fragile to any increase in 
interest rates in the future. Just as before the Great Recession, working people are obliged to rely on 
debt to maintain their living standards. The rise in inequality and stagnation in wages have been one of 
the fundamental flaws in the neoliberal economic model, which have been at the root of the Great 
Recession, and we are far from correcting this imbalance.   
Finally, in the absence of strong investment performance and stagnant demand, it is no wonder 
that the world is in a phase of low productivity and low potential growth. Productivity has two 
components: one is simply related to demand as actual output is demand driven. The second 
component is about potential productivity, which is determined by technological progress, which is 
related to both investment and wage costs. Investment responds to demand; lower wages not only leads 
to lower demand and affects investment through the demand channel, but also makes firms less 
reluctant to invest due to a tendency to exploit low labour costs. Overall, the mixture of 
financialization and rising inequality has created an increasingly more fragile mode of capitalist 
production with volatile demand and stagnant productivity. 
3. The case for a coordinated policy mix of equality-led development and public 
investment 
A strong recovery with decent jobs as opposed to fragile debt driven growth requires a strong 
recovery in wages embedded in a broader macroeconomic and industrial policy, financial regulation 
and corporate governance framework. Only then will investment and productivity follow.  
In this section we first summarize a policy scenario that begins to reverse the decline in the 
wage share along with a concerted increase in public investment in social and physical infrastructure.2 
The scenario is based on a coordinated mix of policies in the G20 targeted to increase the share of 
wages in GDP over the next 5 years by 1%-5% depending on the country, and to raise public 
investment in social and physical infrastructure by 1% of GDP in each country. Building on the 
econometric estimations by Onaran and Galanis (2014), the impact of the increase in the wage share 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This simulation is based on Onaran (2014) prepared for the L20 policy statement at the G20 meeting in 2014, convened 
by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) and Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) to the OECD. A 
more detailed discussion of the simulation results is forthcoming in Onaran (2016). 
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on growth varies in different countries according to the structure of their economies, notably their 
investment, and export and import shares. Therefore the proposed policy mix takes into account these 
differences and proposes differential increases in the wage share in different groups of countries. 
Countries are subdivided into three groups, starting with countries where growth is predominantly 
wage-led including the Euro-area, the UK, the US, Japan, Turkey and Korea. Increasing the share of 
wages in GDP by 5%-points in these countries could result in a wage-led recovery offsetting any 
negative effects on net exports or private investment. The second group includes Canada, Mexico, 
Argentina, and India, where the wage share could be increased by 3% of GDP. While growth in these 
countries when they are treated in isolation is profit-led (i.e. a higher profit share and a lower wage 
share leads to higher growth), a simultaneous increase in the wage share in the G20 (even at an 
equivalent amount in all countries) would lead to higher growth in these countries, as well. Finally, in 
the third group, a modest increase in the wage share by 1% of GDP in China, South Africa, and 
Australia can be pursued as part of a coordinated policy package.  
In a scenario of coordinated wage-led recovery, all countries can increase their growth and 
overall this wage-led recovery could create about 2% higher GDP in the G20 as a whole at the end of 
five years.  
The effect of a coordinated public investment stimulus, i.e. increasing the ratio of public 
investment in physical and social infrastructure to GDP by 1% in each country is simulated under 
different assumptions about the size of multipliers.3 The growth effects of a simultaneous public 
investment stimulus are significantly higher than those of an isolated stimulus in one single country, 
since the former involves cross-country interactions, i.e. international demand spill-overs. The results 
show that a public investment stimulus of 1% of GDP in each country can lead to about 2-4% higher 
GDP in the G20 – compared to business as usual. 
Finally, the results show that a policy mix of coordinated wage increases and public investment 
stimulus can lead to higher GDP in the G20 by 3.9% under the assumption of the lowest multiplier of 
0.5; 4.4% under the assumption of a multiplier of 1.22; 5.5% under the assumption of a multiplier of 
1.8; 5.8% under the assumption of our country specific multipliers. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 One scenario uses the country specific multipliers identified in Onaran and Galanis (2014). The second scenario assumes 
the multiplier to be 1.22 in all countries. This multiplier value is based on the mean of a large sample of multiplier values 
for public investment based on the literature, which has been reviewed by Gechert (2013). Gechert (2013) reports the mean 
of 98 studies published between 1992 to 2013, providing a sample of 1882 observations of multiplier values for public 
investment. The last two simulations are based on the assumption of a high value multiplier, 1.8, and a low value 
multiplier, 0.5, as used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2009) regarding the values of capital spending 
multipliers. 
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In summary, a policy mix of raising the wage share (e.g. through a rise in minimum wages, or 
changes in labour market and trade union and collective bargaining legislation) together with increased 
public investment in social and physical infrastructure would give a significant stimulus  to growth and 
hence employment over a five year period in G20 countries. 
The rise in the wage share may lead to deterioration in the trade balance, depending on the 
labour intensity of exports, pass-through from labour costs to prices, and the price elasticity of exports 
and imports. However, the second component of the policy mix raises public investment, which will 
not only stimulate growth in the short term but also in the medium term would lead to higher 
investment and productivity, a more diversified economic structure, changing the structure of their 
exports towards less labour intensive goods as well as goods with a lower price elasticity of demand.   
The concerns regarding the inflationary effects of wage increases are also not supported by 
empirical evidence. In particular as some advanced countries are at the borders of deflation, policies to 
align wages increases with the historical increases in productivity in the past will only help to reach the 
inflation target, while at the same time helping to generate a wage-led recovery and decent job 
creation. Onaran and Obst (2015) estimate the impact of a coordinated increase in the wage share in 
the EU15 by 1%-point per year, and finds that this will lead to only a modest 1.2 percentage point 
annual increase in inflation in the EU15. This alternative scenario would be consistent with an annual 
nominal wage increase of 3.1% in the EU15 on average (Onaran and Obst, 2015). 
These simulation results do not take into account the potential long term impact of these 
changes on productivity, employment and income distribution. A decrease in unemployment could 
potentially feed back into income distribution, and lead to an increase in the wage share. If profit share 
falls below a critical level, this in turn can increase the sensitivity of private investment to profits, and 
decrease its sensitivity to demand  (Onaran, 2016a). However, if incomes policy mediates the impact 
of growth on distribution once a decent income distribution between wages and profits is achieved, and 
if public investment continues to stabilize demand and private investment, such feedback effects from 
growth to profit squeeze and lower private investment can be minimized. Moreover, the simulation 
results above ignore the potential crowding-in effects of public investment on private investment due 
to a change in business environment and the productivity of the labour force; the more important these 
effects are, the higher will be the multiplier impact of public investment on growth. 
Coordination of wage policies at the European and global level is crucial to ensure that wages 
increase in line with historical increases in productivity to stabilize effective demand, to avoid counter-
productive beggar thy neighbour policies, and to prevent a race to the bottom. In the Euro area, this 
implies that wage policy has to take into account current account surpluses as much as deficits and 
coordination must aim at avoiding a deflationary adjustment with substantially higher wage growth in 
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the surplus countries, while also aiming at convergence in productivity through active investment 
policies (Onaran and Stockhammer, 2016).  
Empirical research results summarized above indicate that Europe is the main beneficiary of a 
concerted rise in the wage share across the world; therefore it should and can take the lead to 
coordinate high road labour market policies as opposed its current practice of leading and imposing 
wage stagnation. Globalization is not a barrier to implementing wage-led growth policies in Europe as 
it is a wage-led region even in isolation; however if such policies are spread to the rest of the world the 
room for manoeuvre and the economic significance of the impact increases substantially.  
A reversal of low-road labour market policies and associated wage stagnation driven by large 
wage-led economies such as the EU will help to create a new development model and space for a 
domestic-demand oriented and more egalitarian growth model in the developing countries as an 
alternative to export-led growth. The results also indicate the importance of developing South-South 
cooperation such that the internal market the developing countries can target can be larger, increasing 
the likelihood of success of wage-led development policies. 
A wage-led development strategy requires policies targeting the top, middle, and bottom of the 
wage distribution (Onaran, 2015). This in turn requires the use of both pre-distributive as well as re-
distributive policies.  
Pre-distributive policies can aim at improving the market distribution of income by a variety of 
policies to build institutions and re-regulate the labour market, to improve trade union legislation, and 
to increase the coverage of collective bargaining, which will increase the bargaining power of labour. 
Improving the union legislation alone could take us a long way: according to simulation results by 
Onaran et al. (2015) for the case of the UK, if the trade union density were to increase back to its level 
in 1980, when half of the employees were member of a trade union (as opposed to the current level of 
union density of 25%), the share of wages in national income could increase by up to 9%-points, and 
GDP per capita in the UK could increase by £444 (or 1.6%).  
Regarding the bottom of the wage distribution, the key priority is establishing a sufficiently 
high statutory minimum wage to address the growth of in-work poverty. Evidence shows that robust 
minimum wages can reduce inequality (ILO, 2012). A rise in minimum wages not only reduces 
reliance on benefits, but also improves demand and growth in a wage-led economy (Onaran, 2015). 
Low-income earners would spend a higher proportion of their income, and this would lead to a further 
increase in growth and employment through the multiplier effect. Raising the minimum wage can also 
increase labour force participation rates, as paid employment becomes attractive, and reduce spending 
on unemployment benefits by the state. The reference point for the statutory minimum wage has to be 
a living wage. 
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The higher end of the wage distribution must be regulated as well. This would increase the 
scope to increase wages at the bottom and the middle, while offsetting the squeeze on profits by 
cutting high managerial wages (Onaran, 2015). The current squeeze of profits by managerial wages 
neither creates sufficient demand as the rich also have a very low marginal propensity to consume, nor 
helps productivity increases. The recent crisis has made it clearer that top executive pay has been 
fundamentally unrelated to firm performance in the financial industry; the problem with top pay is not 
limited to banks but is widespread among large companies in the private sector. Corporate governance 
reforms should aim at curtailing top managerial compensation via limiting the ratio of top pay to 
median incomes in the private sector, while also enforcing the payment of a minimum of a living wage 
at the bottom end of the scale. 
A wage-led growth regime can be seen broadly as an equality-led growth regime, embracing all 
dimensions of equality. Eliminating gender wage gaps as part of a process of an upward convergence 
in wages and eliminating discriminatory labour market practices will contribute to greater equality and 
overall a higher wage share, which in turn, in a wage-led economy such as Europe, will lead to higher 
growth (Onaran, 2016b).  
These pre-distributive policies should be accompanied by redistributive policies both to 
decrease inequality and to tame the power of capital. This requires a rise in corporate and wealth tax 
rates as well as top marginal income tax rates. We need to restore the progressivity of the tax system. 
Progressive income tax could be used to impose a maximum income, with the highest marginal tax 
rate increasing to 90-95% above a threshold corresponding to the top 1% of incomes. In the UK 
between 1974 and 1979 the top income tax rate in the UK was 83% on incomes above approximately 
£91,000 in today’s prices (£24,000 at 1979’s; Onaran, 2015).  Another possibility is suggested by 
Goda et al. (2016) to link top income and wealth taxes to median incomes and median wealth holdings, 
e.g. a top marginal tax rate of 70% for income above 10 times the median income, a top marginal tax 
rate of 10% on all personal net wealth (excluding primary residence) that is above 100 times the 
median wealth, and of 90% for all inheritances that are above 100 times the median wealth.   
The empirical evidence summarized in Section 2 indicates that the effects that can come from a 
wage-led recovery on growth and hence employment are positive, however they are also modest in 
magnitude. Wage-led growth is not a magic bullet to solve all the ills of our current economic model 
and secular stagnation. For sustainable and egalitarian development, we need to mobilise all of the 
tools of economic policy and in particular public spending with an aim to achieve full employment, 
ecological sustainability, and equality. This brings a synchronisation of wage policy, fiscal policy and 
industrial policy coordination to the core of economic policy. 
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A properly designed industrial policy, along with stimulated demand and regulation of finance 
and corporate governance is required to reinstate the missing link between private investments and 
profits. But a crucial question is also to redefine the role of public investment in socially much needed 
areas in particular in two areas: ecological investments and social infrastructure.    
Any progressive way out of secular stagnation should take the climate change and the urgency 
to limit the carbon emissions seriously into account. Growth without considering the impact on the 
ecology is not a sustainable policy. Ecological sustainability requires a shift in the composition of 
aggregate demand towards long-term green investments, which in turn calls for an active public 
investment policy. Private profit motive is insufficient to mobilize resources in the right direction in 
the right time frame. Public investment, in green industries like renewable energy, public transport, 
and housing are essential to meet emissions targets to address the ecological crisis.  However, policy 
design should also take into account that any public green investment has quantitatively lower than the 
expected effects on carbon emissions, because of the macroeconomic rebound effect, i.e. any green 
public investment increases income which increases spending which, in turn, increases carbon 
emissions. Green public investments are still likely to decrease carbon emissions but the important 
question is how much public spending we need in order to avoid extreme global warming.4  
Second, . Public spending in health, education, childcare, and elderly care (Onaran, 2016b) is 
currently defined as current spending, although it should be adequately redefined as capital spending in 
people.  These public services are currently provided inadequately by the private sector based on profit 
motive, and the deficit in this field is currently provided by unpaid invisible female labour. The need 
for social infrastructure is not sufficiently met under the present circumstances with an inadequately 
low public spending in this field; private providers fill in the gap by supplying these services either at 
very low wages (to ensure an adequate profit) or as luxury services for the rich, and a large part is 
provided via invisible unpaid female labour within the gendered division of labour at home. To avoid 
this care deficit, a rise in spending in social infrastructure by the state or by non-profit/community 
organisations is required.  Greater public provision of social infrastructure would create employment in 
labour-intensive social services, and be a vehicle for generating full employment with lower rates of 
growth—a target more consistent with low carbon emissions.  
This could also hit another target namely increasing female labour force participation rates via 
socialising the invisible and unpaid care work done by women. Ilkkaracan (2013) has called these 
purple jobs. However, these jobs need to be made attractive to both men and women by improving pay 
and working conditions in these industries. A new orientation of policies towards creating high-skilled, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 I am grateful to Yannis Dafermos for this comment. 
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decent jobs in the social sector should be promoted instead of the current reliance on low-pay service 
jobs and weak labour unions. Such policies would put gender equality in pay and employment at the 
heart of a wage-led development strategy. However, if women are concentrated in the types of paid 
work where the prospect of higher wages does not exist, these policies may still be insufficient to 
significantly improve women’s incomes. Wage policies should reflect the added value of social 
infrastructure for society, and should gradually target the problem of occupational segregation. This 
implies a clear break from current policies and the imposing of pay freezes on public sector workers, 
who are predominantly women.  
Finally, a key policy measure to maintain full employment along with low carbon emissions 
and a more equal income distribution is a substantial shortening of working time in parallel with the 
historical growth in productivity (Onaran, 2015; 2016b). Reduction in weekly working hours should 
take place without loss of wages, in particular in the case of low/median wage earners, which means an 
increase in hourly wages as well as in the wage share. Again, this is not unrealistic given historical 
trends—compared to the 19th century we are all working part-time today. The implications of shorter 
working hours for equality are twofold. First, shorter hours with wage compensation only for lower 
wage earners will imply a narrowing of gender wage gaps. Secondly, a proper shortening of the 
working hours should help address daily care responsibilities and enable a more equal work/life 
balance based on gender equality in the division of labour in the household, e.g. this requires shorter 
daily working hours as opposed to more holidays or longer weekends. Overall, shorter working time 
with wage compensation is likely to lead to a substantial restructuring of the economy. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper summarizes two main findings in the Post-Keynesian literature regarding the 
linkages between financialization, income distribution, accumulation and productivity. Firstly, at the 
core of secular stagnation lies the missing link between profits and investment. Secondly, rising 
inequality and financialization have been the main reasons for this missing link and hence the major 
brakes on capital accumulation and growth.    
The empirical evidence regarding the vicious circle of financialization, rising inequality, slow 
down in accumulation and productivity, hints at alternative progressive policies based on a coordinated 
policy mix of equality-led development and public investment. A crucial issue is how a public 
investment programme could be financed in practice. Yet if fiscal multipliers are high enough fiscal 
expansion could generate the tax revenues to eventually reduce the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Hence, 
governments should not start with the budget deficit as the aim of policy but, to rephrase Keynes for 
our times, focus on taking care of full employment, decent pay for women and men, equality, and 
ecological sustainability, and the budget will take care of itself.  
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Figure 1: The share of wages in GDP* and Growth of GDP, 1960-2015 
Figure 1.a. The US 
 
 
 
Figure 1.b.The EU15 
 
 
 
Note: Labour compensation adjusted for the labour income of the self employed as a ratio to GDP at 
factor cost; 2014 and 2015 are provisional data. (Source: AMECO). 
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